From the WSJ Opinion Archives
BELTWAY BATTLES
Revenge of the Nerds
Richard Clarke is a consummate bureaucrat, but he doesn't understand a politican's job.
Back when he was funny, David Letterman did a recurring skit called "Narrow Perspectives," in which a boring academic critiqued what in his small world seemed the most important part of a major motion picture. In one memorable episode, an energy expert fumed about all that gas-guzzling stop and go driving during the chase scenes in "Mad Max."
Letterman nailed the lifeblood of bureaucracy: specialization. Good bureaucrats--not an oxymoron--spend all their days thinking about the highly specialized mission of their agencies, whether protecting the homeland or protecting the snail darter. Bureaucrats want all resources going to their work, with only crumbs left for the rest of us.
Good politicians, on the other hand, must ration their time and money to many competing interests. They can never give their hearts to just one thing.
The two tribes also have different styles. Many bureaucrats are nervous nerds. But politicians have to win elections, so they have folksy charm like George W. Bush, a commanding presence like National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice, or at least a dignified mien like John Kerry. The relationship between bureaucrats and politicians resembles that between high school nerds and jocks. The nerds ace the tests and resent when the jocks crib their notes. And of course we all know who gets to go to the prom, and to run student government.
In the world of Washington, the policy-wonk nerds expect the politician jocks to follow their advice, or at least to pretend to listen. The politicians, for their part, expect the nerds to be loyal.
I was reminded of the clashes between bureaucrats and their political masters as former National Security Council bureaucrat Richard Clarke lambasted the pre-9/11 unwillingness of his boss, Condoleezza Rice, and President Bush himself to recognize what he knew in his bones: that al Qaeda was America's pre-eminent national-security threat. As the NSC staffer in charge of monitoring al Qaeda, Mr. Clarke spent 12 hours a day trying to get inside Osama bin Laden's head--an assignment sure to warp anyone. Indeed, Mr. Clarke advocated pre-emptive attacks on Afghanistan in the 1990s, years before reasonable people (much less the U.N.) came on board.
In contrast, Ms. Rice, in visibly angry testimony before the 9/11 commission last week, insisted that she and President Bush had to manage competing threats. Just as Mr. Clarke named al Qaeda the top foreign threat, NSC Korea experts thought that North Korea, which murdered two million people and threatened to spread nuclear weapons, deserved the title of global enemy No. 1. Still others saw China, with a billion people, hundreds of nukes, and threats to incinerate Los Angeles, as America's biggest nightmare.
Most notably, Kenneth Pollack, the Clinton administration NSC Iraq expert, assured both Clinton and Bush officials (and later the public, in his bestselling "The Threatening Storm") that Iraq required immediate attention. After all, until 9/11 al Qaeda had killed only dozens and lacked sophisticated weaponry. In contrast, Saddam Hussein used Iraq's oil money to murder at least 1.1 million people, start two wars, threaten neighbors with invasion seven times, develop a nuclear "research" program (at least through 1996), and attempt to assassinate one U.S. president.
With all these competing threats, what are political leaders to do? For the Clinton administration, the answer was to focus on the Palestinian issue, in hope of weakening recruitment into terrorist groups like al Qaeda. While Mr. Clarke now recalls having good relations with President Clinton's political appointees, the Washington Post reports that Clintonites "despised" him because, as then-NSC staffer James M. Lindsay recalls, they "thought he was exaggerating the threat" and "always wanted to do more" than higher-ups approved.
The Bush administration focused less on diplomacy than Mr. Clinton had, instead developing long-term plans to overthrow the Iraq and Afghan governments. For obvious reasons, after 9/11 Afghanistan become the top priority, and Richard Clarke briefly got his way. But after routing the Taliban, the Bushies turned to Iraq. Given recent Iraqi history, it seemed a rational decision.
Rational perhaps, but wrong for Mr. Clarke, who continued to insist even after the defeat of the Taliban that al Qaeda should be the first and only priority and that he, Mr. Clarke, should be a major player. By his own admission, Mr. Clarke saw himself as Ahab to Osama's white whale. Mr. Clarke paid for his zealotry when Ms. Rice demoted him "out of the loop"--the ultimate humiliation for a Washington insider.
But now, with the benefit of hindsight and a national audience, Mr. Clarke is living every bureaucrat's dream: a best-selling book that will make him millions and might just switch enough voters to bring down the jock in the White House. Not bad for a nerdy Harvard professor.
Mr. Maranto teaches political science and public administration at Villanova University, and served in government during the Clinton administration.
