THE WEEKEND INTERVIEW
Secretary of Turbulence
Condoleezza Rice takes the long view--maybe too long.
NEW YORK--Condoleezza Rice arrives 10 minutes early for her interview with The Wall Street Journal, dressed in a red suit and a single strand of white pearls. She says "Hi, Condi Rice"--I can't decide if this is good manners or fake modesty--and sits for a breakfast, which she doesn't touch. No coffee or tea, either. She speaks for five minutes and takes questions for the rest of the hour.
The conversation ranges from Bolivian coca to Iranian IEDs to administration leaks. Some of what she says is bland, some of it bunk, some of it smart and some of it revealing. It all takes shape in sentences that flow one from the other, paragraphs that maintain their discipline and logic, arguments that never lose sight of their destination, even when they digress. Ms. Rice is nothing if not a pleasure to listen to, which may explain why even critics who say she's become too much a creature of the State Department would love to see her name on the Republican ticket in 2008.
Which, by the way, isn't going to happen, at least if by "no, no, no" she truly and unambiguously means no. But her refusal is less interesting than her reasoning for the light it sheds on how she sees herself as Secretary of State. The conversation begins with her describing herself as an academic and ends by saying how glad she'll be to return to Stanford "and do something else." She observes that her stint in the administration of George H.W. Bush took place at the end of one "great historic transformation," and that her current stint takes place at the beginning of another. Her goal for the next two years is to put "some fundamentals in place": "I don't think that this is a battle, if you will, or a struggle that's going to be won on George W. Bush's watch," she says of the war on terror. Maybe this accounts for her sang-froid--at times seeming to border on emotional detachment--in the face of all the reversals in Baghdad, Beirut, Cairo and Ramallah: She chooses to read the present as if it were already the past.
There's something to be said for thinking about the world this way, and Ms. Rice is nothing if not clear about the nature of the enemy, the shape of the conflict, the need to rally "moderate democratizing forces" throughout the Middle East as the great antidote to Arab and Islamic radicalism. On the terrorists: "They're not going back into the woodwork. They have to be defeated." On Iraq: "We just have to fight tooth and nail for the victory of the Iraqis who do not want Iranian influence in their daily lives." On Iran: "We've got a chance to resist the Iranian push into the region, but we better get about it. I mean, it's not the sort of thing that you can just let continue in its current form." On Lebanon: "You have to resist Hezbollah . . . [and] try to strengthen the moderate Lebanese forces, which is not an easy matter." On the Palestinians: "You have to resist the Damascus Hamas, creating a situation in the Palestinian territories where moderates can emerge."
On the other hand, there is also a danger in acting as if the conflict we're in is of the long, twilight struggle kind when Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Osama bin Laden seem to believe it's Apocalypse Nigh. And there is an even greater danger in acting as if the problems the U.S. has encountered, particularly in the last year, are evidence of "turbulence" (a word she uses repeatedly) and not, say, of loss of altitude or even critical engine failure.
Thus, implicit in much of what Ms. Rice says is the idea that the U.S. has the luxury of time. I ask about the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad, which a year ago appeared to be on the point of collapse yet today has reasserted itself in a big way in Lebanon, particularly thanks to Hezbollah's perceived victory in the summer's war against Israel. "This is one of those twists and turns. . . . I started speaking to at the beginning. I don't think you can kind of know today the effect of Syria's isolation from the Arab world." (Pressed on the subject later on, she concedes that "we're going to have to start looking at further sanctions on Syria.")
I also ask about Egypt, where last year she gave a speech demanding that the regime open the door to democracy but has since watched in virtual silence as Hosni Mubarak cancelled elections and cracked down on dissent: "These things also . . . go in waves. I don't think that Egypt is ever going to be the same place again after the competitive presidential elections"--elections which, she neglects to add, were rigged against the primary challenger Ayman Nour, who now sits in a prison cell, serving a five-year sentence (on trumped-up charges of election-related fraud, no less!).
And of course there is Iran. Ms. Rice notes that, until recently, the State Department didn't actually have an Iran desk, which she reads (in an implicit rebuke of her predecessors) as evidence of a blinkered, bureaucratic mindset that thinks of foreign relations as "those with whom you do relations rather than . . . policy." She also says the U.S. will set up an Iran section in Dubai, modeled on the famous "Riga Station" the U.S. maintained in Latvia to monitor the Soviet Union before diplomatic relations were established in the 1930s. "We have to increase our capability to mine resources and intelligence about Iran. And one of the challenges is that we haven't been in the country for 26 years. And you would be surprised what it does to both your diplomatic and intelligence capability to not be in the country."
During another point in the conversation, she observes that the Soviet Union tested an atomic bomb five years before the West thought they would have one. This raises the question of whether the West can afford to take its time with Iran. "Well, the problem is of course that you never know what you don't know," she says.
But that sits somewhat incongruously with her broader approach to the Iranian challenge. "The international system will agree on a level of pressure. I think it will evolve over time." She opposes measures such as barring Iranians from international sports events or a gasoline embargo (to which Iran is particularly vulnerable, since it imports 40% of its refined gas), because of their "bad effect on the Iranian people." Instead, she stresses the benefits of a consensual, U.N.-centered approach, says the Europeans have been "very strong on this," and adds that she's had "very good discussions" with the Chinese and the Russians about what a sanctions resolution would look like if the Iranians don't suspend enrichment. She thinks even a comparatively weak resolution would have "collateral effects on the willingness of private companies, private banks, to do business with Iran." She hopes it will have an effect on Iranian officials who "do not want to endure the kind of isolation that they're headed toward." Do these people even exist? "I do not believe we're going to find Iranian moderates," she says. "The question is, are we going to find Iranian reasonables?"
That's an interesting way of framing the matter, although perhaps not quite in the way Ms. Rice intends. There are, in fact, Iranian moderates: They are the 80% of the people who oppose the regime. The House has just approved the Iran Freedom Act, which says the U.S. should "support peaceful pro-democracy forces in Iran," and mirrors the 1998 Iraq Liberation Act that became a precursor to regime change there. President Bush used the occasion of his speech to the U.N. General Assembly to speak directly to the Iranian people, telling them "the greatest obstacle to [your] future is that your rulers have chosen to deny you liberty and to use your nation's resources to fund terrorism, and fuel extremism and pursue nuclear weapons." The State Department itself has increased its budget for supporting Voice of America radio and TV broadcasts in Farsi. What's telling is that Ms. Rice mentions none of this: Her primary method for dealing with the Iranian regime, it seems, is to deal with the regime, not to seek to change it.
Ms. Rice is even less persuasive when the subject turns to the Koreas, North and South. The point is made that South Korea has not been especially helpful to the Bush administration in dealing with the North. She demurs. "Go read what [South Korean President] Roh Moo-hyun said" during his recent press conference with President Bush, she says. "It was pretty remarkable."
And what exactly did Mr. Roh do that was so remarkable? "Well, for instance, they have cut fertilizer supply to the North. They have cut, actually, food assistance. They've pulled back some of their basic assistance to the North. They continue their economic relations, but I think the implication is pretty clear that if the North were to go further, maybe even that's at risk."
Tough stuff--or not. South Korea still throws Pyongyang a lifeline through the Kaesong industrial park--where South Korean companies benefit nicely from what amounts to North Korean slave labor. Just a few weeks ago, Mr. Roh even demanded that a church group not send religious leaflets northward on balloons. It's hard to tell here whether Ms. Rice is putting a best face on relations or simply deceiving herself as to what a lackluster ally South Korea has been to the Bush administration.
Something else is disconcerting, albeit so subtle that I only noticed it in the transcript of the interview. Rewind the tape and linger over the words "the Damascus Hamas." What's with the definite article? Ms. Rice circles back to the subject later in the discussion, when the subject of Islamist gains in democratic elections comes up. "Hamas," she says, "has learned a pretty tough lesson. They have not been able to govern. . . . You know, all of the talk about . . . all this Iranian money coming in and they . . . were going to be supported, it hasn't happened. People are on strike, they can't make their peace with the international community, and it's been really tough. And, in fact, it's been especially tough if you are [Palestinian Prime Minister Ismail] Haniyeh in the territories, as opposed to [overall Hamas leader] Khaled Mashal in Damascus."
The lesson here would seem to be that by putting a diplomatic and economic quarantine on Hamas after its victory in January's election, Palestinians have been made to recognize that there is a price to be paid for electing the Martyrs' Party. But the suggestion--which is gaining increasing currency in the foreign-policy establishment--is that Hamas is, or may with encouragement become, two parties: A radical, IRA-type wing led by Mashal in Damascus and a "moderate," Sinn Fein-like one led by Haniyeh in Ramallah. Does Ms. Rice really believe this? I kick myself for not asking, but someone should.
Finally, inevitably, there is Iraq: "The strategic direction is set," she insists. She points to successes, such as the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and military operations in the Euphrates Valley to stop infiltration from Syria, as well as the need to "get some of the militias under control." She acknowledges the possibility of error: "If there are adjustments that you can make, if there are things that are not being pressed hard enough, if there are some alternative ideas, by all means, I think we'd be delighted to have them," she says in reference to former Secretary of State James Baker's Team B-style exercise on Iraq strategy.
What she doesn't repeat, however, is a story I heard her tell at a previous meeting with Journal editors last year, when she said that she had telephoned George W. Bush as she flew out of Baghdad on her (then) most recent visit: "Mr. President," she said (and I quote from memory) "this is going to be a great country."
Perhaps she feels that way still: It would be distressing indeed if she did not.
Mr. Stephens, a member of The Wall Street Journal's editorial board, writes the Global View column every Tuesday.
