AFTER THE STORM
Hinterland Ahoy!
Why don't folks on the Gulf Coast move to the Dakotas?
In the past four weeks we have seen two different governmental responses to disaster, one efficient, the other, frankly, disastrous. Providence has spared Houston and much of urban east Texas, but that city's response to Hurricane Rita--and the comparison with New Orleans--should give us pause in thinking not only about how we deal with the mess left behind by Katrina, but also the future of the Gulf Coast.
In 2001, the director of Louisiana State University's hurricane center described New Orleans' establishment as "lulled to sleep" in the face of a predictable, looming disaster. In the months before Katrina, big new spending focused not on shoring up levees or storm-related plans but on a $450-million expansion of the now infamous convention center and an initiative to cash in on the city's "cultural economy." City and state failed to develop an effective evacuation plan and, when disaster struck, implemented their half-baked plan with astounding inefficiency.
In contrast, Texas--and the Houston area in particular--has been industrious, building elaborate drainage, sewer, flood and other systems to handle the delivery and control of water into the metropolis. Such foresight has been a prerequisite for great cities from the days of ancient Rome to contemporary Los Angeles. Importantly, this should not be seen as a partisan issue but one of civic patriotism. As New York's Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia once noted, "There is no Republican or Democratic way to clean streets."
Both Texas Governor Rick Perry and Judge Robert Eckels, effectively the overseer of Harris County, are Republicans. Two of the most important architects of Houston's infrastructure spending, former Mayor Bob Lanier and current Mayor Bill White, are Democrats; Mr. White, in fact, was the highly partisan former chairman of Texas State Democratic Party.
Houston's investment and planning accelerated following the floods resulting in 2001 from Hurricane Allison, which dumped 37 inches of rain on the area and killed 22 people. When Rita hit, Houston's leadership was prepared to get folks out, something which, despite glitches, was largely accomplished. The city's famed hospitals were ready with secure power sources and the police, as well as the Guard, were prepared to act. Even if Rita had slammed the Houston region directly, it is unlikely we would have seen anything like the catastrophe that affected New Orleans. Houston would have buckled, and some lives may have been lost along with homes and businesses, but its civil society would have remained intact. The Astrodome would never have become a house of horrors.
The huge discrepancy between the Texas and Louisiana responses should call into question the assumptions that have been trumpeted since Katrina. Foremost, we need to reconsider the central focus on the role of the federal government. Historically, the first responders in a crisis have been local officials, the province being more one of mayors and governors than presidents.
History shows that the key determinant of success is the competence of local government. When local officials are responsive and prepared--as seen from the 1994 Northridge, Calif., earthquake to recent hurricanes in Florida and, now, in east Texas--FEMA plays its role with some effectiveness. But when local officials are inept, the shortcomings of the federal bureaucracy become more obvious. So although reform of FEMA may well be appropriate, any massive post-Katrina federal bailout of New Orleans should be tempered by skepticism about the ability of state and city officials to determine priorities or to execute plans with efficiency.
Federal taxpayers should insist that funds be designated for long-term investments toward both infrastructure and preparation. Currently, there is a great danger that much of the money may be used to underwrite massive real estate speculation and a famously corrupt political culture. Others are calling for federal funds to construct an expensive experiment in urban social engineering.
Perhaps an even more difficult lesson lies in changing our approach to development along portions of the Gulf coastline. This region, with the notable exception of New Orleans, is one of the fastest growing in the U.S. Its relatively low costs and balmy climate have turned it into the "opportunity coast." Yet clearly the Gulf's history has shown that ignoring nature has its perils. Few now remember Indianola, south of Houston. Until it was wiped out by hurricanes, first in 1875 and then again in 1886, it was Texas's second-largest port. Today, most of that city lies under water.
The other, better-known case, is Galveston. Before a 1900 hurricane--which took 6,000 lives--it was the premier port and commercial center on the Texas coast. After the hurricane, the flow of commerce shifted inexorably to inland Houston, which was, and remains, better protected from the Gulf's annual tantrums. Such lessons should guide development along the Gulf in the coming years. For one thing, it may make sense to use marketplace mechanisms--in the form of insurance premiums--to let developers accurately assess the risk of new development. After all, federal assistance may be limited in the future. Some places may need to be abandoned. Whole towns already have been demolished for safety reasons in parts of the Mississippi flood plain as have homes in some of the riskier parts of east Texas. Programs to buy houses from existing residents, move towns to higher ground and create new greenbelts, will benefit the environment--not to mention the taxpayers--by relieving them of the burden of subsidizing repeatedly flooded areas.
A less extreme but equally sensible course can be applied throughout the Gulf region by steering new development--through either environmental or insurance restrictions--further out into the interior.
More broadly, as a nation, we may want to consider ways to encourage greater development further inland. Americans have been crowding into the coasts for generations, even though one of our great assets is the broad interior hinterland. Our continued population growth--from 310 million now to 400 million by 2050--may make repopulating the hinterlands more economically viable. Instead of offering "homesteads" or funds for repeated rebuildings on the crowded, and sometimes dangerous, coasts--particularly in below-sea-level New Orleans--it might make more sense to encourage settlement and investment deeper into our nation's interior.
This was the essence of much of 19th-century federal policy, which gave incentives for canals and railroads, as well as providing cheap or free land on the Plains. This could also bring new life to parts of country that have been losing jobs and people for a generation, but may now be ready for revival. With the Internet and small-jet travel, some of these areas, such as the Dakotas, are already showing signs of becoming more competitive in the national and global economy. It is a trend worth boosting, and may come to be the most attractive strategic lesson to emerge from Katrina and Rita.
Mr. Kotkin, an Irvine Senior Fellow at the New America Foundation, is the author of "The City: A Global History" (Modern Library, 2005).
