FROM THE FRONT
Frontier Menace
What are we doing about the terrorists organizing on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border?
ISLAMABAD--A sign outside the U.S. Embassy in Kabul reads: "The U.S. Embassy would be grateful if any of our friends who have information on terrorist activity or threats inform us between 10 a.m. and 12 p.m. on Sunday through Thursday." Written on a big billboard in English as well as in Afghanistan's official languages, Pashtu and Dari, it stands directly across from the main gates of the embassy, which is encased by giant walls topped with rolls of barbed wire and guarded by sentries in sandbag bunkers.
The sign seems absurd. Is information that could help bring terrorists to justice only welcome during a two-hour time slot on working days? Yet it drives home the difficulty that the U.S. faces in gathering intelligence in countries like Afghanistan, where even non-military Americans have to wear bulletproof clothing and can only travel in massively armed convoys.
That means they can only talk to people handpicked for them, often by hosts who don't always want the whole truth told. It also leads to a heavy reliance on drop-ins--those who can muster the courage to face the overwhelming show of security and knock on the embassy gates, and then only during the right hours. That's true not just in Afghanistan, but also in Pakistan, where unaccompanied journeys by U.S. intelligence personnel are equally unthinkable in the country's tribal regions. Instead, the U.S. embassy in Islamabad--another island surrounded by formidable security--places a significant reliance on drop-ins, according to a CIA official stationed there. Other intelligence is bought, by paying locals in these inhospitable regions to speak out.
The sections of the 9/11 Commission report on Pakistan and Afghanistan reflect this intelligence vacuum. The report states the obvious--that the border regions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as southern and southwestern Afghanistan, are likely places for terrorists to congregate. It also gives the impression that the former Taliban regime gave birth to the isolated terrorist camps in Afghanistan, and the lawless atmosphere that allowed such activities to flourish.
The reality is that these camps predated the Taliban's September 1996 victory, and flourished unhindered when many of those associated with the current U.S.-backed Afghanistan government were last in power. For example, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, a power-broker in Kabul now aligned to the U.S.-led coalition, requested and received Afghan passports for more than 600 Arabs in 1993-94, while he was a faction leader in the pre-Taliban government.
The sort of company that Mr. Sayyaf keeps was made all too clear at a recent press conference, where Ahmed Shah Ahmedzai, a close ally and former lieutenant in Mr. Sayyaf's Islamic Union, announced his candidacy for president. At that press conference, Mawlawi Mufleh, a radical cleric, denounced the presence of U.S. troops in the country and called for the establishment of an Islamic theocracy stretching from Afghanistan to Morocco.
Another region identified by the 9/11 Commission report as an ideal sanctuary for terrorists is the border region of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran. Again, the reality is that the region is a decades-old route used by drugs and weapons smugglers, in addition to would-be terrorists. A former member of the Taliban's security apparatus told me that this region is still being used to move money, mostly originating in Saudi Arabia, to the Taliban and al Qaeda.
He explained how the chain began with the money being given to Afghan businessmen living in Saudi Arabia, who used an informal money-transferring system to move it to Afghan businessmen in Iran. They, in turn, used their business connections to move the money to al Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan. A former member of the Taliban regime said that 1,000 al Qaeda operatives, possibly more, were in the border regions of Afghanistan--accessible from Pakistan--while the Taliban were in power, and are most likely still there. That is information that should have been readily available to U.S. intelligence services before 9/11, and which should have been acted on after the collapse of the Taliban.
Terrorists are also active on the Pakistani side of the border, where they are known to have links with local militants and even intelligence officials. But again there would appear to be an intelligence vacuum as far as the U.S. is concerned. For example, Wana in South Waziristan Agency has been the focus of recent antiterrorist operations. Yet no one of significance has been seen in the area, and only Chechen and Uzbek fighters are believed to be present. It seems the Pakistan military may be using the operation as a cover to tame the tribesmen of that area, rather than actually find and arrest significant members of al Qaeda.
A more logical area to focus on would be the Bajour Agency in northwestern Pakistan, which lies just across the border from Kunar and Nuristan regions in northeastern Afghanistan. Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the renegade Party of Islam leader wanted by the U.S., is popular in Kunar and Nuristan--where heavily forested mountains make for easy camouflage, and Osama bin Laden was known to have camps before Sept. 11, 2001. While its Pakistani partners keep the U.S.-led coalition busy hundreds of miles to the south, Taliban and al Qaeda move with relative freedom farther north, and in some of Pakistan's most congested cities, including Quetta and Karachi.
The 9/11 Commission report also praises President Bush and Congress "for their efforts in Afghanistan so far." That however deflects from the many problems the country faces. Afghanistan is the world's largest opium-producing country and warlords allied with the government, either directly or indirectly, allow the drugs trade to continue to flourish. The Taliban, soundly defeated in 2001, are becoming increasingly active. Ordinary Afghans, disappointed at the pace of reconstruction, blame the international community for failing to disarm warlords. Many ordinary Afghans and even some in top government posts privately say elections should be postponed until the country has been thoroughly disarmed.
A more productive approach would be to take a hard look at the misplaced support and the allegiances of those the U.S. calls friends in Afghanistan. Why have the private armies controlled by commanders loyal to the Defense Minister Mohammed Fahim not been disarmed? Why has Mr. Fahim refused to hand over his weapons to the central government and been allowed to stymie the development of a national army?
Almost three years after the Taliban fell from power, the gun rules in Afghanistan. President Hamid Karzai made a courageous decision last week when he chose not to include Mr. Fahim as running mate on his presidential ticket. For many, that was the first real sign of Afghanistan trying to break from its violent past. Yet within 24 hours of that announcement, Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. ambassador, was meeting with Mr. Fahim, and publicly promising to heal his wounded feelings.
The 9/11 Commission report says, "The United States and the international community should help the Afghan government extend its authority over the country, with a strategy and nation-by-nation commitments to achieve their objectives." The tragedy is that, unless there is a rethink of existing policies and priorities, the opposite is in danger of happening.
Ms. Gannon, who has reported for the Associated Press from Pakistan and Afghanistan for 16 years, is writing a book about Afghanistan.
