AT WAR
The Case for Military Action
Colin Powell is "going the last mile" at the U.N. tomorrow.
The argument for disarming Iraq by force has become conclusive. In his report to the Security Council, chief U.N. weapons inspector Hans Blix made clear--even if the words were never used--that Iraq is in material breach of Security Council Resolution 1441. In that resolution, the council unanimously ordered Baghdad to do three things: cooperate, disclose and disarm. The Blix report showed that Iraq has defied the U.N. on all three counts.
Iraq's efforts to develop weapons of mass destruction and the potential for their proliferation represent a serious threat to international peace and security. That threat cannot be countered by containment, which has been tried for 12 years and has failed. On Tuesday, the president was eloquent on Saddam Hussein's intransigence: "Nothing to date has restrained him from his pursuit of these weapons--not economic sanctions, not isolation from the civilized world, not even cruise-missile strikes on his military facilities."
The case for military action is therefore compelling. It cannot be deferred indefinitely as Iraq continues to play its cat-and-mouse game with U.N. inspectors. Nor can it be held hostage to lowest-common-denominator consensus in the Security Council. Yet the administration is absolutely right in going the last mile and sending Secretary of State Colin Powell to consult again with the Security Council and lay out, commensurate with protection of intelligence assets, further evidence of Saddam's efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction.
There are several reasons for going back to the Security Council. First, the U.S. gains by creating the broadest possible coalition in support of military action against Iraq. Yes, we should be prepared to act with a "coalition of the willing," but the more who join that coalition, the better. A broad coalition would not just deflect criticism--false but pervasive--that we are intervening in Iraq from selfish imperialist motives. It would also prove useful after hostilities, as we move to ensure stability in Iraq and begin its economic reconstruction. And forming such a coalition, particularly if it includes moderate Arab states, will help create momentum for an initiative led by the U.S. to jumpstart peace talks between Israelis and Palestinians. Such an initiative, in addition to its own merits, will help allay Arab suspicion of U.S. military action against Baghdad. Lastly, consulting yet again with the Security Council will give its members a last chance to "do the right thing." If the council cannot bring itself to step up to its responsibilities and enforce its own resolutions, it risks becoming a toothless debating society.
But an "extra mile" is just that: an extra mile. The U.S. cannot be drawn into months of delay as Baghdad continues its charade with inspectors and the capabilities of allied forces in the Gulf degrade. We cannot be bogged down in a search for a "smoking gun" when we have the strong evidence of the Blix report itself that details Iraq's refusal to cooperate as mandated by Resolution 1441. Nor can we heed arguments that U.N. inspectors are a viable alternative to force, when the only reason they are in Baghdad today is because U.S. troops are poised for action along Iraq's border.
Security Council endorsement of military action against Baghdad would be useful in terms of generating an international coalition. And so we, and our U.K. ally, should be prepared to try for a vote supporting such action if we believe we are close to having the nine affirmative votes needed, unless we think one of the other three permanent members (France, Russia or China) would use its veto--something I personally don't think would occur if there are nine votes in favor. But even if the council withholds support, we should nonetheless be prepared to act, "for the safety of our people and for the peace of our world"--as the president put it last Tuesday.
There is still a slim chance that war can be averted. Saddam's regime may be overthrown or he may go into exile. But the odds in favor of military action are now overwhelming. Whatever the Security Council does now, the U.S. is well positioned to justify its actions to the American public and other countries. Moreover, when the U.S. and its allies achieve victory in the field, we can expect to see governments that opposed military action falling in line behind U.S. leadership.
But let us have no illusions. Armed conflict is never cost-free. With good planning and some luck, losses will be low. But there will be casualties among American and allied servicemen and women as well as Iraqi civilians. In addition, war can create dynamics that are difficult to predict and control. This is particularly true of the Middle East, where a U.S.-led campaign against Iraq may give rise to even more anti-American sentiment.
Yet we cannot allow the real risks associated with acting against Iraq to paralyze us. They must be balanced against the risks of inaction--in this case, a future nuclear, biological or chemical attack against the U.S., its allies, or Iraq's neighbors. We cannot permit Iraq to become another North Korea. Leadership is not about making easy decisions. It is about making right ones. When it comes to Iraq, the administration has made the right one. With Secretary Powell's mission to the U.N., it is now up to the Security Council to make the right one as well.
Mr. Baker, secretary of state under the first President Bush, is honorary chairman of the Baker Institute for Public Policy at Rice University.
