From the WSJ Opinion Archives
AFGHAN DISPATCH
Get Rid of the Warlords
Afghanistan can't continue to be run by thugs.
KABUL--What is a "warlord"? Afghanistan seems to be crawling with them these days, though it must be noted that not all are the same, or even rate that daunting label. They range from brutal, heavily armed thugs who have been empowered by foreign powers, to provincial wannabes who can be shoved off the stage fairly easily. Some are so unworldly, in fact, that when dollar sums are bandied about they can't grasp the value unless it's explained to them in terms of how many Toyota Land Cruisers it will buy.
Whether they're seasoned killers or just wearing a bandolier to look macho, those we call warlords have one thing in common: None were chosen through the traditional Afghan route of consensus and vote by tribe or village elders. That lack of accountability is what makes them a threat, not just to Afghans but to the success of the larger war against terrorism. It is also the weakness through which they can be brought down. Even so, efforts to neutralize them won't work unless the U.S. and other friends of Afghanistan go after them with the same determination they are showing in the search for Osama bin Laden.
One of the thorniest cases is Abdul Rashid Dostum, the Uzbek "general" from northern Afghanistan. During the Soviet war, he headed a vicious communist militia recruited among Afghan Uzbeks and trained in the Soviet Union to rape and torture, thus striking maximum terror into the hearts of anticommunist villagers. After 1992, he and his militia shot up Kabul alongside factions of the former mujahideen, until they were all driven out by the Taliban. Now most are back as part of the Northern Alliance.
Uzbeks never chose Gen. Dostum, and there's no indication that the majority like him at all, though his muscling into the national limelight may impress simple folk. The chief thing he's got going for him is money, and with it the ability to pay his militia. Cut that off, and how many of those fighters will stick around, especially if international aid provides jobs through which they can return to a normal life?
Ask Turkey, which helps to support Gen. Dostum and hosts his family--not because they admire him, officials admit in private, but because he's a fellow Turkic-language speaker. While visiting Turkey this week, he made friendly noises toward the interim government in Kabul, suggesting that the Turks are using their influence. Next, they should turn off the tap that pays militia salaries and read him the riot act: Either get with the peace program, or you're history.
Ditto for Ismail Khan, who's now holding court again in Herat, out in western Afghanistan. Unlike Gen. Dostum, he has an honorable record of fighting the Soviet invaders, though he's changed allegiances so often since that many Afghans now label him an opportunist. He fled from the Taliban into Iran, which is still said to be giving him orders, money and weapons. Ismail Khan denies this. But there's a simple way to find out, and deal with him.
Like many other former resistance commanders clawing for fiefdoms again, Ismail Khan must be forced to decide: Either he pledges allegiance to Kabul and demonstrates it--chiefly by disarming the Herat region and handing over weapons to the central government--or he will be forcibly removed from power.
Such an ultimatum won't work unless the threatened force includes American, British or other foreign soldiers with a clear mandate to finish the job. Afghans can't do it on their own. There's no national army, and sending an armed group to Herat from another province conjures up the internecine scenario everybody wants to avoid. But a force that included foreigners--and U.S. Marines or British paratroopers dripping with high-tech weapons truly impress the Afghans--could do the trick, perhaps without a shot being fired. If warlords are convinced that their only choice is between cooperation and being knocked off their perch forever, they may make the right decision.
A different ultimatum can be issued to people like Abdul Qadir, now returned as the putative governor of Nangarhar province in eastern Afghanistan. Haji Qadir, as he is known, is basically a glorified fixer. He's never had a real job and isn't a respected tribal leader. He comes from a family of smugglers, and he got where he is by being the man to see if you want wheels greased, for starting up poppy crops again, or whatever. Haji Qadir is no bold warrior. The road from Kabul to Jalalabad and Pakistan has been a no-go zone for weeks now. But he can't or won't do anything about the banditry there, and has told the U.N. that if officials want the road open, they have to patrol it themselves or make their own security arrangements in Kabul.
What to do about a creep like this? Considering the country's other problems, it may be simpler to leave him in place for the moment, with one caveat: His job depends on keeping the peace and he will personally be held responsible for anything that goes wrong in his region. Since the people of Nangarhar are traders, a closed road from Kabul is a disaster. Make Haji Qadir solely responsible for law and order, and he'll shape up or the locals will shift their loyalty elsewhere.
Some warlords are more incompetent than evil, and can be pensioned off, perhaps with a face-saving offer of a seat on an advisory council of former resistance commanders. That might work with someone like Qari Baba, who is back in the governor's seat in Ghazni, south of Kabul. He was a bulwark against the Soviet invaders and isn't a plundering gangster.
In the early 1980s, though, people were executed in Ghazni after Qari Baba smelled their hair and detected the scent of Lux soap. To his unlettered mind, washing with soap instead of the natural clay the peasants used was a sign of education--thus potential infection by communism. He later realized the error of his ways, and offered to support the widows of the innocents he had killed. Yet few in Ghazni would be sad if he were eased out and they could pick their own leaders, with cleaner slates.
Finally, there's a mixed bag like Gul Agha Sherzai, the governor of Kandahar province. Kandaharis shuddered when he was reappointed, because gangsterism during his previous tenure is what gave rise to the Taliban. He has such limited popular support, in fact, that he's had to recruit a large palace force among members of a former communist militia.
During the anti-Soviet war, the militia followed the lead of a swaggering boozer, drug addict and rapist named Ismat Muslim. The story told by an American diplomat based in Kabul in the late 1980s says it all. Hearing raucous music emanating from Ismat's Kabul house one night, the diplomat peered over the backyard fence they shared for a closer look at the festivities. What he saw was the body of a hanged man slowly twisting from a tree branch, as Ismat and his militiamen boogied the night away nearby.
Ismat Muslim later died of lifestyle-related ailments in a Czech hospital and his militia rejoined the anticommunist side. Today, they and Gul Agha Sherzai have earned brownie points by working with the U.S. military to disarm the region. Gul Agha does seem to have let some Taliban bigwigs escape, and in person he comes across as a nincompoop. For now, however, he may be the only man for the job.
Above all, warlordism is bad because it furthers the designs of those inside and outside Afghanistan who don't want stability there because that would reduce their opportunities for meddling. One thing is clear, though: Warlords are not like old soldiers--they don't just fade away. Unless they are confronted by a determined united front of Afghans and genuine foreign friends, many of them will continue to threaten the peace in Afghanistan, and thus keep the wounds open for more maggots of terrorism.
Ms. Smith is a member of the Journal's editorial board. In a future installment, she'll answer readers' questions. To submit a question, write us at opinionjournal@wsj.com.
